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How would, and should, secular conservatives think about same-sex 
marriage?  A conservative or quasi-conservative case can be made for 
gay marriage rights, but most conservatives are surely opposed or at 
least deeply skeptical.  Amy Wax gives a sophisticated and thoughtful 
account of why.  She captures the spirit as well as the substance of why 
conservatives, especially those whose thinking is broadly in line with 
Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott, might be very reluctant to change 
the marriage laws to institute gay marriage. 
But Professor Wax’s essay raises a key question: How should people 
of conservative temperament think about change?  Liberals, radicals, 
technocrats, and rationalists—all these might tend to put the onus on any 
existing institution to justify itself.  From these (nonconservative) points 
of view, if a traditional way of doing things cannot be shown to be fully 
consistent with desirable principles, then the way should change: at least, 
it should unless there is a convincing, rational case against reform.  This 
is to take liberalism, radicalism, and so on as abstract ideals, of course.  
Few actual human beings, perhaps, would adopt this stance toward all 
existing institutions: certainly not toward institutions in which they have 
a personal stake.  For example, liberal or leftist academics who have an 
interest in existing practices such as academic tenure could safely be 
expected to put the burden of proof on anyone proposing to abolish or 
radically reform them.  And most conservatives, likewise, are not 
conservative all the time, especially when there are interested reasons 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Affiliated 
Professor, University of Haifa. 




not to be.  But conservatives, on the whole, do believe that the burden of 
persuasion should be on the advocates of change; their presumption is in 
favor of existing institutions and ways of doing things.  This is 
essentially the definition of being conservative. 
Yet, as Professor Wax notes, conservatives are not simply, categorically, 
and always against change.  It would be untenable—in fact, it would be 
ludicrous—to suggest that people or their ways could or should never 
change or evolve.  Burke and Oakeshott, like other conservative thinkers, 
and indeed like any sane person, acknowledge that some change is good, 
and some is inevitable.  How, then, should a conservative think about 
gay marriage?  It is surely not enough to say “the burden of persuasion 
should be on the proponents.”  Such a “burden” is, at best, a kind of 
metaphor drawn from the law courts.  Even in court, the meaning of the 
various “burdens of proof ” tends to be elusive.1  For proponents of gay 
marriage, specifically, what should they have to prove?  How, and how 
convincingly, should they have to prove it? 
Professor Wax quotes Edmund Burke: 
[T]he ground for a legislative alteration of a legal Establishment is this, and this 
only; that you find the inclinations of the majority of the people, concurring 
with your own sense of the intolerable nature of the abuse, are in favour of a 
change.2 
In other words, as a politician, you should “acquiesce in change only if 
both the public and [you] concur that some modification is necessary.”3  
And “[m]inor changes should be resisted; it is only when the abuse is 
‘intolerable’ that change is warranted.”4 
This may not be very helpful, however, either for the gay marriage 
debate or more generally.  First, if you resist all change until abuses are 
intolerable, then you preclude gradual, evolutionary change, and you 
implicitly await and invite eventual revolutionary, seismic change—which 
is surely the opposite of a conservative attitude.  Oakeshott, too, seems 
to resist “tinkering.”  “He comes out against what he terms the ‘politics of 
felt need’, which he characterizes as the relentless tendency to identify 
problems or dissatisfactions with existing arrangements, however small, 
 1. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409–11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979) (exploring the wide variations in how the various burdens 
of proof are interpreted).  See generally Rita J. Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying 
Burdens of Proof, 5 L. & SOC’Y REV. 319 (1971) (divergent understandings by judges 
and jurors of the various burdens of proof). 
 2. Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Social Change, Traditional 
Institutions, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059, 1075 (quoting 
MICHAEL FREEMAN, EDMUND BURKE AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL RADICALISM 160 
(1980)). 
 3. Id. at 1071.   
 4. Id. 
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and then to pursue immediate action to correct the perceived flaws.”5  
The more passionate advocates of gay marriage, of course, contend that 
existing institutions and laws are a grave abuse, not a trivial or even a 
tolerable one.  In various practical as well as symbolic ways, they claim, 
the denial of gay marriage denies homosexuals the chance of a “normal” 
family life, and demeans and diminishes them as human beings.  The 
question, of course, is how to assess these claims.  But any conservatism 
that admits change only when abuses are intolerable invites the 
advocates of any change to persuade themselves, as the first step toward 
persuading others, that a given object of reform is not merely an object 
of reform but a grave and intolerable abuse.  It opens the door to the 
politics of passion, of uncompromising grievance—which again might 
seem to be the opposite of what conservatives ought to be promoting. 
As for Burke’s suggestion that you should oppose any change unless 
“you find the inclinations of the majority of the people” already favor it, 
Burke himself conspicuously failed to comply.  Burke, famously, was a 
friend of American independence, and vehemently opposed British warfare 
against the rebellious colonies after July 1776.6  Yet the American 
Revolution, until after the conclusion of the War of Independence, probably 
never had majority support even in America, much less in Britain.7 
If these passages, at least, from Burke and Oakeshott do not offer a 
convincing conservative theory of change, might the gap be filled by 
Friedrich Hayek, a third thinker to whom Professor Wax alludes?  Hayek 
is skeptical of social engineering, and of ambitious command-and-control 
 5. Id. at 1072. 
 6. See Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America (1775), in ON 
EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND REFORM: SPEECHES AND LETTERS 62 (David Bromwich ed., 2000); 
see also Edmund Burke, A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol on the Affairs of America 
(1777), in ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND REFORM: SPEECHES AND LETTERS 138 (David 
Bromwich ed., 2000). 
 7. Robert M. Calhoon, Loyalism and Neutrality, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 247 (Jack P. Greene & J. R. Pole eds., 1991) 
(“Historians’ best estimates put the proportion of adult white male loyalists somewhere 
between 15 and 20 per cent.  Approximately half the colonists of European ancestry tried 
to avoid involvement in the struggle . . . . The patriots received active support from 
perhaps 40 to 45 per cent of the white populace . . . .”).  Other historians put the numbers 
of loyalists even higher, and of patriots lower.  John Adams is frequently quoted as 
guessing that a third of Americans were for independence, a third were loyalists, and a 
third were indifferent.  See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 
1492—PRESENT 76 (20th anniv. ed., 1999).  The numbers surely fluctuated before and 
during the War of Independence, and are scarcely ascertainable with much confidence 
today. 




schemes for reform, primarily because of the problem of knowledge 
costs.  A reformer or regulator has to know a lot—often, perhaps, more 
than any one person or institution can possibly know—in order to change 
existing institutions wisely.  Which reforms would benefit a diverse multitude 
of people?  What will be the real consequences of a particular reform?  
Free markets, says Hayek, are decentralized: they spread decisions among 
many people, each of whom has reason to know what he, she, or—in the 
case of collective bodies—it wants.  Of course, people can make mistakes 
about this, but at least decentralized decision-making spreads the risk of 
error among a larger number of people.  Hayek was preeminently a critic 
of central planning.  Social engineering is apt to be inefficient, he says, 
because it presumes a level of knowledge that is difficult or impossible to 
acquire, especially “from the top down” in a large and complex society.8 
But Hayek’s views have equivocal implications for the gay marriage 
debate.  Introducing gay marriage, or instituting any radical reform of 
marriage, can surely be characterized as social engineering of the kind 
that Hayek warns against.  But from another point of view, it is marriage 
itself—insofar as it is a state-sponsored and state-supported institution—that 
amounts to social engineering.  In other words, it might be just as valid 
an inference from Hayek’s ideas, instead of opposing gay marriage, that 
marriage and family law as a whole ought to be privatized: that people 
should make their own arrangements, by contract or otherwise, based on 
their greater knowledge about themselves, without state favoritism for or 
against any particular form of family, or for or against families altogether. 
Friedrich Hayek, to be sure, sits rather uneasily with Edmund Burke 
and Michael Oakeshott.  There is at least a difference in emphasis, 
and perhaps in fundamental outlook, between Hayek’s skepticism of 
central authority and his enthusiasm for free markets, and the more 
tradition-minded conservatism of Burke and Oakeshott.  Hayek, after 
all, is more identified with the “libertarian” than with the “traditionalist” 
strain of conservatism. 
As Professor Wax rightly implies, however, secular conservatives—Burke, 
Oakeshott, and Hayek as well—all tend to share a belief in value 
pluralism: in the idea that there are many competing ideals and goods in 
life, but no single utopian principle that can systematically and consistently 
give the right answer to every public (or private) question.9 
 
 8. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 9. See JOHN KEKES, A CASE FOR CONSERVATISM 34–36, 191–99 (1998) (arguing 
that value pluralism is an important element of secular conservatism).  Value pluralism is 
most closely identified with the writings of the English twentieth-century philosopher 
and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin.  See SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, THE PROPER STUDY OF 
MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1997). 
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Value pluralism is by no means confined to conservatives, of course.  
But value pluralism has particular resonance for secular conservatives 
who are suspicious of utopianism and of a “rationalist” approach to 
public policy—the kind of approach that puts a premium on consistency, 
on legalistic thinking, on abstract adherence to principle, and on 
institutional reforms guided by experts and central planners.  Value 
pluralism suggests, on the contrary, that public life (and private life too) 
require rough compromises among conflicting goods, which no social 
engineer can hope to reduce to ideological consistency. 
Does value pluralism point the way to an answer in the gay marriage 
debate?  Value pluralism emphasizes that there are various competing 
and conflicting visions of life, and that there is good in many of them.  
Hence it implies that there should be the greatest feasible tolerance for 
various ideas and ways of life.  This might in turn suggest—unless there 
are strong reasons against it—that there ought to be some “social space” 
for gay marriage, if only as an experiment, without necessarily mandating 
that gay marriage should be lawful everywhere. 
In a federal system, it is often possible to have laws that reflect diverse, 
even conflicting, values within a single nation.  As such, federalism is an 
attractive political vehicle for value pluralism.10  Federalism enhances human 
possibilities in this practical sense: whereas emigrating to a foreign country 
is unrealistic for most people, federal pluralism within one country can 
mean considerable freedom of choice for citizens about where to live, 
under which laws to live, and hence which values to live by. 
Value pluralism seems to imply, then, that the best solution would be 
for gay marriage to be lawful in some states or provinces, but not in 
others: at least unless there are very strong reasons, outweighing value 
pluralism, for it to be lawful in all, or in none. 
Things are more complicated, alas, on closer consideration.  There are 
many areas of law that lend themselves to different, even contradictory, 
treatment in different jurisdictions.  Tax rates can be higher in one state 
or province, lower in another; social welfare provisions can be more 
generous in one than in another; business regulation can be more or less 
onerous; one state can have the death penalty, another can abolish it.11  
 10. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial Restraint, 
95 NW. U. L. REV. 961, 974 (2001) (arguing that federalism is usually favorable for value 
pluralism). 
 11. Thirty-eight states now have the death penalty in some form; twelve states 
have no death penalty.  See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200–02 (2005). 




There will often be spillover effects even on these matters, to be sure: 
tax rates and business regulations can attract, or repel, people to or from 
a given state.  But within reasonable limits, states have latitude to 
legislate on such subjects in ways that reflect value pluralism: different 
laws, reflecting diverse values, in different states. 
State laws instituting gay marriage, however, may fit awkwardly, or 
not at all, into this framework.  The problem, of course, is that people 
(and couples) are mobile.  If I contract a gay marriage in one state, to 
what extent must it be recognized in other states?  There is a doctrinal 
question under the Constitution of whether my marriage is entitled to 
“full faith and credit” in other states.12  Even if the answer to that 
question were “no,” it would be difficult or impossible for other states to 
ignore the marriage entirely.  If I lawfully contract a gay marriage in one 
state, can I later contract a heterosexual marriage to someone else in a 
state that does not recognize gay marriage?  What about child custody 
disputes, to the extent that state law takes marriage into account—which 
it sometimes does—in adjudicating such disputes?13  What if the surviving 
partner to a gay marriage claims property in a no-gay-marriage state 
from the estate of the deceased spouse, on the basis of being the 
surviving spouse?  Confining the legal effects of gay marriage to states 
that actually institute it would be difficult, and the prospects for conflict 
among the states, including conflicting court judgments, might be 
considerable.14  And beyond the strictly legal repercussions, gay marriage in 
one or more states might have profound cultural consequences in other 
states, well beyond the ripple effects of tax or welfare laws, or even 
death penalty laws, that now differ from state to state. 
More broadly, it may be uncertain whether value pluralism conduces 
for gay marriage or against it.  There is an obvious argument that pluralism 
supports gay marriage.  Gay marriage would add to human choice.  
Heterosexual marriage is lawful everywhere, after all: no one proposes 
to forbid it.  But if there is good in heterosexual marriage and in the 
ethos it bespeaks, there might be good in gay marriage as well, and in 
the different ethos and body of values that it might represent.  Instituting 
gay marriage would expand the range of human possibilities; it would in 
no way contract it.  And federalism would add a further element of 
 12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.  Congress has now enacted the Defense of Marriage 
Act which purports to permit states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages from other 
states, if they so choose.  The relevant portion of DoMA is at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 
2005). 
 13. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 48–49 (Ga. App. 2002) (refusing to treat 
a civil union as a marriage for purposes of interpreting a child visitation clause in a 
consent decree). 
 14. See Brian Bix, State Interest and Marriage—The Theoretical Perspective, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–07 (2003). 
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pluralism if gay marriage, and whatever changes in social climate that 
might go along with it, were adopted in some states but not in others. 
But the case against gay marriage can be put in value pluralist terms as 
well.  Especially if the effects of instituting it cannot be confined to 
particular states, gay marriage might not expand human choice so much 
as it would substitute, nationally, a new ethos for the old one: an ethos in 
which marriage no longer means what it used to mean.  Up to now, 
marriage has remained substantially a traditional institution.  Marriages 
are no longer indissoluble, if they ever were, but they are not purely 
private agreements whose terms are up to the parties.  Legally as well as 
culturally, there are important elements in marriage that derive from 
religious ideas: “to have and to hold from this day forward, for better for 
worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to 
cherish, till death us do part, according to God’s holy ordinance.”15  
As such, marriage is a remnant, or an oasis, of premodernism—of 
what Henry Maine called “status” and Ferdinand Tönnies called 
Gemeinschaft—in a modern or postmodern world that is overwhelmingly 
driven by the values of “contract” or Gesellschaft.16  To preserve marriage 
in something like its traditional form, from a value pluralist point of 
view, is to preserve an institution whose values are at odds with the main 
currents of modern life: currents dominated by free choice and free 
contract, by mobility, by innovation, by reason or by what Max Weber 
called “rationalization.”17  Gay marriage, to be sure, might not erode the 
values now implicit in marriage, but strengthen them, by extending them 
to gay couples.  But skeptics view gay marriage as a big step towards 
“rationalizing” marriage, towards adapting it to the range of choices that 
modern or postmodern people are accustomed to in the marketplace.  
Skeptics also believe that the mores of unmarried gay people are as 
likely to influence gay marriages—and through gay marriages, 
ultimately to influence all marriages—as for the influences to run the 
other way.  To update marriage in this way, a value pluralist might 
argue, would be to erode an institution, and an area of life, embodying 
 15. BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 304 (London: Cambridge Univ. Press n.d.).   
 16. See HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 304 (14th ed. 1891) (the progress of 
societies is from status to contract); FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY & SOCIETY 
(GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT) (Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., Mich. State  Univ. 
Press 1957) (1887).  For an overview of the sociological classics on this topic, see 
ROBERT A. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION (1966). 
 17. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 




values that challenge and provide an alternative to the values now 
prevalent in most other areas of life.  Hence, gay marriage would be a 
step towards greater uniformity of values, not towards greater pluralism. 
There is no formula for resolving which of these value pluralist 
arguments, for and against gay marriage, is the stronger.  That plausible 
arguments for and against can both be put in value pluralist terms 
suggests that as to this, and perhaps as to other important public 
questions as well, value pluralism is more a temperament than a 
conclusive formula.  There are surely things that value pluralism would 
preclude: totalitarian enforcement of any single-minded way of life 
comes obviously to mind.  But there are many issues which value 
pluralism might not resolve, and about which value pluralists could take 
various and conflicting views. 
As with value pluralism, so likewise for conservatism.  There is no 
formula for resolving how traditionalist conservatives should think about 
gay marriage, or about social change in general.  It is unlikely that many 
conservatives would be sympathetic to judicial decisions holding that 
gay marriage is a federal constitutional right.  As Richard Posner has 
written,  
It is possible to make good lawyers’ arguments that there should be a federal 
constitutional right to homosexual marriage. . . .  The only thing wrong with 
these arguments is the tacit assumption that the methods of legal casuistry are 
an adequate basis for forcing every state in the United States to adopt a social 
policy that is deeply offensive to the vast majority of its citizens and to do so . . . 
[on the basis of arguments whose] moorings in text, precedent, public policy, and 
public opinion would be too tenuous to rally even minimum public support.18 
But Posner, a pragmatic if not a traditionalist conservative, does not 
absolutely reject gay marriage.  “Let a state legislature or activist (but elected, 
and hence democratically responsive) state court adopt homosexual 
marriage as a policy in one state, and let the rest of the country learn 
from the results of its experiment.”19  Traditionalists, of course, might be 
skeptical that such an experiment could be contained within the bounds 
of the single-state laboratory. 
An abstract theory of social change will not be forthcoming from 
traditionalist conservatives.  As Amy Wax says, suspicion of abstract social 
theories is fairly central to traditionalist conservatism.  The conservative view, 
or temperament, is well expressed by Isaiah Berlin, the twentieth-century 
author most closely identified with value pluralism.  There are no scientific 
laws for assessing or managing social change, says Berlin.   
 18. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 249 
(1999). 
 19. Id. at 250. 
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What is needed, instead, is a “sense of reality”, “being able to size up the 
situation, knowing when to leap and when to remain still”:20   
What is called wisdom in statesmen, political skill, is understanding rather than 
knowledge—some kind of acquaintance with relevant facts of such a kind that it 
enables those who have it to tell what fits with what: what can be done in given 
circumstances and what cannot, what means will work in what situations and 
how far, without necessarily being able to explain how they know this or even 
what they know.21 
It is in some such terms that conservatives think about and debate gay 
marriage: a few supporting it, more no doubt opposing it.  On the whole, 
to make a successful case for gay marriage to conservative-minded 
people, it will surely be necessary to persuade them that gay marriage 
will not fundamentally erode or transform marriage, or the values that 
have long been implicit in family life.  Doing this may be especially 
difficult given that some supporters of gay marriage plainly have little 
love for traditional ways.  For practical political purposes, it is not just a 
question of persuading conservatives, of course.  But as to gay marriage 
at least, it is probably true to say that whatever might be required to 
persuade the conservative-minded, persuading any substantial body of 

















 20. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE SENSE OF REALITY: STUDIES IN IDEAS AND THEIR HISTORY 
33 (Henry Hardy ed., 1996). 
 21. Id. at 32. 
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